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Abstract 
We examine the impact of remittances on economic growth using panel data (1975-2014) for 18 
countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that are similar in size and development level. 
We allow for heterogeneous production functions across countries and calculate the average 
marginal effects of remittances using the panel dynamic ordinary least squares estimator. The 
estimation results show that remittances increase growth significantly, especially through 
investments in human capital. In addition we find that: (i) remittances have a modest impact 
on growth when controlling for physical and human capital channels through which 
remittances potentially affect output growth; (ii) when we do not control for human capital the 
effect is larger regardless of the sub-samples considered − the elasticity of output with respect 
to remittances is 7.3 percent in the full sample, and 18.6 percent among Asian countries; (iii) 
remittances have a significant positive long-run effect on human capital formation regardless 
of the sub-samples considered but the effect on physical capital accumulation is significant only 
among middle income and Asian countries. The findings suggest that channeling the 
remittances towards investments in physical capital and adoption of new knowledge, skills and 
technology is crucial for high economic growth in low income countries. 
Keywords: Economic growth; human capital; international remittances 
JEL Codes: C24, O15 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, remittances have emerged as a main and stable source of international 
financial resources in developing countries (World Bank, 2017). However, whether 
remittances work as a source of development finance for saving, investment, employment, 
education, health, poverty reduction, and economic growth in the developing world is highly 
contested. Since Stark and Bloom’s (1985) seminal work, an extensive body of literature 
evolved on this issue (see Adams (2011) for review of recent household surveys).  
Previous studies on the growth effect of remittances show mixed results. On the one hand, 
several studies show a positive growth effect conditional on ancillary variables such as 
financial development, human capital, and the institutional quality of a country (Catrinescu, 
Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, & Quillin, 2009). On the other hand, a few studies conclude that 
remittances have negative effects on growth (Chami, Fullenkamp & Jahjah, 2003) or no 
effect (Spatafora, 2005). The mixed findings may possibly be due to the estimation 
approaches and assumptions; for example, homogeneity of parameters among starkly 
heterogeneous countries.1 In addition, to our best knowledge, previous studies rarely explore 
the long-run effect of remittances on physical and human capital accumulation at the macro 
level (Ngoma & Ismail, 2013). Surprisingly, some studies control for schooling and 
investment in the regression models, the channels through which remittances possibly do 
impact economic growth, and conclude that remittances have an adverse growth effect (e.g., 
Nwaogu & Ryan, 2015).  
In this context, we re-examine the issue by (i) considering a panel of similar countries, (ii) 
estimating production functions accounting for the effect of remittances possibly through 
total factor productivity and physical and human capital, (iii) adopting an advanced 
econometric methodology to relax the assumption of homogeneity among parameters across 
countries and the exogeneity of remittances, and (iv) estimating the long-run effects of 
remittances on physical and human capital investment. We include countries from Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that have moderate values for population size and area, with low 
income (below US$ 1,000 constant 2010) in the early 1970s, or at least dropped below this 
threshold level during the 1970s, 1980s, or early 1990s. We investigate data availability and 
include only 18 sample countries for 1975-2014 in our study. Methodologically, we estimate 
separate production functions for each country with capital, labor, and other factors that 
affect total factor productivity (TFP). Unlike previous works that either assume the 
exogeneity of remittances or use instruments to account for endogeneity, we relax the 
                                                            
1 For example: Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1997) show that the assumption of homogeneous parameters 
across countries leads to substantial biases in the estimates. 
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assumption of the exogeneity of remittances while allowing for heterogeneity in the log-run 
parameters across countries, using the less restrictive panel dynamic ordinary least squares 
(DOLS) estimator (Stock & Watson, 1993).  
We find a positive and significant effect of remittances on per capita GDP, even after 
controlling for physical and human capital in the model. The results are robust, but vary by 
sub-group categorized on low and middle income, and Asian and SSA countries. We find 
larger growth effects for middle income countries compared to low income countries, and for 
Asian countries compared to those in SSA. The effect becomes large when we allow for the 
effects of remittances on growth through the human capital channel. We also confirm the 
positive and significant long-run effect of remittances on human capital investment, 
regardless of the sub-sample. However, the effect on physical capital accumulation is 
significant only among middle income or Asian countries. Similarly, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has a positive and larger effect on growth than remittances, investment 
and human capital do. Meanwhile, we find no growth effects of foreign aid in the sample 
countries. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on 
remittances and economic growth. Section 3 describes the data and econometric model. 
Section 4 presents the results, discussion, and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes the 
paper with policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
Theories and models on economic growth depict different channels or sources that affect 
economic growth (Acemoglu, 2008). We thus assume that international remittances affect 
economic growth through three different sources. First, remittances may contribute to 
physical capital accumulation, a proximate causes of growth, by relaxing credit constraints 
and fostering investment, for instance, on productive assets such as household assets, 
equipment, housing, and establishment of enterprises.2 On the one hand, when a significant 
portion of remittances are used for so-called non-productive goods such as jewelry, land, and 
so on, it may create a short-run aggregate demand and a short-run growth effect, but may 
slow long-run growth due to the failure to contribute to saving and investment. On the other 
hand, remittances, as a main source of income for several poor households of LDCs, may 
                                                            
2 For example: Yang (2008) on investment in capital-intensive enterprises in the Philippines, Adams and 
Cuecuecha (2013) and Kagochi and Kiambigi (2012) on housing in Ghana and Kenya, respectively, and 
Woodruff and Zenteno (2007) on the establishment of enterprises in Mexico. 
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help boost basic food consumption in these households, leading to significant poverty 
reduction (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2013), but it may not necessarily increase investment.  
Second, remittances combined with international migration may contribute to long-run 
growth through human capital investment. Migration may have a "brain effect" and a "drain 
effect" on growth through human capital (Beine, Docquier & Rapoport, 2001). Remittances 
may have an 'income effect' on both the quality and the quantity of children’s education, such 
as increased school enrollment, decreased dropouts, and enhanced transfer from public to 
private schools through financing the direct and opportunity costs of schooling. However, 
the magnitude may depend on the severity of credit constraints (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 
2014; Calero, Bedi & Sparrow, 2009) and the local environment (Alcaraz, Chiquiar & 
Salcedo, 2012). Meanwhile, international migration may increase the importance and 
returns on schooling among migrants from information-constrained households, thus 
leading to higher investment in children's education (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). 
Third, remittances may affect growth through TFP, although the direction of the effect is not 
clear a priori. It may enhance the economy’s productivity through the acquisition and 
adoption of new knowledge, skills, and technology from a worldwide diaspora financed 
through remittances.3 In addition, remittances may enhance labor productivity in labor 
abundant countries that receive sufficiently large remittances, which work as a source that 
converts labor into capital (e.g., Mamun, Sohag, Samarg & Yasmeen, 2015 for cross-country 
panel work; and Mamun, Sohag, Uddin, & Shahbaz, 2016 for a case of Bangladesh). In 
contrast, remittances may adversely affect growth by degrading the economy’s 
competitiveness and the effectiveness of government institutions. Increased demand for 
consumption may increase inflation, thus leading to an appreciation of the real effective 
exchange rate and decrease production in the tradable sector—the Dutch Disease syndrome 
(Lartey, Mandelman, & Acosta, 2008; Sapkota, 2013). Meanwhile, remittances may create 
distortions in labor markets such as a decrease in participation particularly among non-
migrant members of recipient households (see Bayangos & Jansen, 2011, for the 
Philippines). In addition, some scholars find that remittances may weaken the quality and 
effectiveness of government, for instance, by prolonging the duration of the government by 
funding patronage (Ahmed, 2012). 
Empirical evidence on the growth effect of remittances is mixed. Several studies show 
positive effects of remittances (see Cooray, 2012; Imai, et al., 2014; Siddique, Selvanathan & 
Selvanathan, 2012). However, the sign and magnitude of the effects may depend on other 
                                                            
3 See, for example, Le (2008) on the effect of international labor migration on technology transfer in OECD 
countries, and Le (2010) on the transfer of R&D from OECD countries through students to DCs. 
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ancillary factors such as institutions, financial development, human capital, and so on. For 
instance, Catrinescu et al. (2009) show that remittances have no robust positive growth 
effect while they do not control the institutions in their model examining 162 countries 
(1970-2003), but find positive and larger growth effects while interacting with institution in 
the model. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) show a positive growth effect of remittances 
among developing countries, and substitutability between remittances and financial 
development for growth, in contrast to the complementarity found in 25 Latin American and 
Caribbean (LAC) countries (Mundaca, 2009) and South Asia (Cooray, 2012). In contrast, few 
studies find an adverse or no effect of remittances on growth (e.g., Singh, Haacker, Lee, & 
Goff, 2011; Le, 2009). Utilizing the labor-leisure framework, Chami et al. (2003) show a 
negative effect of remittances on growth using panel data of 162 countries (1970-1998). The 
authors argue that the moral hazard problem among non-migrant members decreases their 
participation in the labor market, leading to an adverse growth effect. Nwaogu and Ryan 
(2015) find that remittances have no effect on growth among 87 African and LAC countries 
during 1970-2009. However, the authors use investment in physical capital and schooling as 
control variables, thus blocking the channels through which remittances may potentially 
affect growth. 
Previous studies on the growth effect of remittances generally adopt similar econometric 
models (Cooray, 2012, among few exceptions). These works mostly use panel data for a 
region, a few regions, or developing countries and attempted to identify causality between 
remittances and GDP per capita growth using panel econometric approaches such as fixed 
effects, random effects, generalized method of moments (GMM), and instrumental variable 
estimates. Despite similar methods and data sets, these studies yield contrasting results, 
possibly due to the assumption of homogeneity among countries, lack of an effective 
identification strategy to deal with the endogeneity of remittances, and over-controlling the 
channels of growth. To fill this gap, we estimate the long-run growth effect of remittances 
with country-specific production functions among similar countries, considering the possible 
endogeneity of remittances, and allowing for the growth effect of remittances through the 
TFP and physical and human capital investment channels. 
2. Data and model specification 
Data sources and description 
We analyze panel data of similar countries from Asia and SSA. While selecting panel 
countries, we consider countries of moderate size (measured by population above 10 million 
and below 200 million) and with income in 1971 (below US$ 1000 per capita GDP, at 2010 
constant prices). We also include countries that had higher than US$ 1000 during the 1970s 
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but fell below during the 1970s or 1980s in the sample. Thus, our sample excludes several 
small low-income countries such as land-locked or island countries, as well as large countries 
such as China, India, and Indonesia (which although had low income in 1971, do not meet 
the population criterion). Meanwhile, most of the sample countries exhibit high ethnic 
diversity and mostly experienced internal conflict or external invasion since the 1960s. We 
thus believe that our sample is more homogenous in size and the initial level of development, 
which provides a ground for validating our estimation and results. However, we did not 
include some similar countries in the sample due to lack of data on the variables of interest. 
Hence, we have a panel of 18 countries, split evenly between low and middle income 
according to the World Bank classification (2017). Due to the availability of remittances data 
from 1975 (except for few countries), we include data covering 1975-2014 and have an 
unbalanced panel of 720 observations. 
The main source of data is the World Development Indicators (2017) from the World Bank 
(2017). However, we complement the data using annual data series of human capital from 
the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar & Timmer, 2015). Human capital is an index based 
on the linearly interpolated average years of schooling and returns on primary, secondary, 
and tertiary level schooling (Barro & Lee, 2013; Caselli, 2005). We use population, GDP, 
GDP deflator, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), personal remittances, net FDI, and net 
official development assistance (ODA) inflows as a measure of foreign aid from WDI. 
Nominal data are deflated by the GDP deflator and expressed in 2010 US dollars. We 
compute physical capital stock data series using GFCF. Following Goldsmith (1951), we 
construct capital stock series using the perpetual inventory method (PIM) as follows:  
۹ܑ,ܜ = 	 ۷ܑ,ܜ + (૚ − ઼)۹ܑ,ܜି૚       (1) 
where Ki,t is the physical capital stock of a country i in year t, δ is the depreciation rate (we 
assume 5 percent for our sample countries), and Ii,t is investment in year t for country i. We 
measure investment by the flow of the gross investment (GFCF) in the current year. GFCF 
includes land improvements; plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and construction 
of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential 
dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings. Following Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader 
(2007), we rearrange equation (1) to get the following equation.  
۹ܜି۹ܜష૚
۹ܜష૚ = 	−઼ +	
۷ܜ
۹ܜష૚	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
We assume that in the long run, the growth rate of capital stock is constant over time and is 
equal to the real GDP growth rate (g), thus we get 
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۹ܜି૚ = 	
۷ܜ
(܏ + ઼)																																																																																					(૜) 
Using equation (3), we calculate the initial capital stock (K0) for each country. 
Remittances include personal transfers in cash or in kind received by resident households 
from nonresident households and compensation of employees from countries in which they 
are not resident or of residents employed by nonresident entities. FDI includes direct 
investment equity, that is, equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, and other capital flows in 
the economy. Finally, foreign aid is the sum of the disbursement of loans made on 
concessional terms (net of repayments of principal) and grants from official donors.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample countries with average growth rates 
during 1975—2014. MICs have about a three times higher average real GDP per capita than 
LICs do and Asian countries have about double per capita GDP than SSA countries do. The 
ratio of average capital stock to GDP per capita is also higher among MICs than for LICs. 
Average human capital, per capita remittances, and FDI is also higher in MICs than in LICs 
and Asian countries than in SSA countries, in contrast to the average per capita foreign aid. 
The average real growth rate of GDP per capita, capital stock per capita, human capital, per 
capita remittances, and per capita FDI is higher among MICs and Asian countries than in 
LICs and SSA countries respectively. In contrast, the population and foreign aid growth rate 
is higher in LICs than in MICs, and in SSA countries than in Asian ones.  
//Table 1 about here// 
Econometric specification 
Following the approach of empirics of the growth literature, we assume that for a set of 
countries i= 1,2, .., N, over a number of years, t=1,2, ….T, the GDP of each country, Yit, is 
produced by physical capital, Kit, and labor employed, Lit, through a standard Cobb-Douglas 
function as: 
܇ܑ,ܜ = ۯܑ,ܜ۹ܑ,ܜહܑۺܑ,ܜ(૚ିહ࢏)													૙ < ߙ௜ < 1										    (4) 
where Ai,t is the measure of total factor productivity (TFP). We argue that TFP is determined 
by human capital (HCi,t), remittances (REMi,t), FDI (FDIi,t), and foreign aid(AIDi,t): 
ۯܑ,ܜ = ۴ܑ(۶۱ܑ,ܜ, ܀۳ۻܑ,ܜ, ۴۲۷ܑ,ܜ, ۯ۷۲ܑ,ܜ)                      (5) 
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Thus, we can express the output per worker, augmented with TFP by substituting Ai,t from 
equation (5) into equation (4), as:  
ܡܑ,ܜ = 	 ܋ܑ + હܑܓܑ,ܜ	 + ઺૚ܑܐܑ,ܜ + ઺૛ܑܑܚ ,ܜ	 + ઺૜ܑ܎ܑ,ܜ	 + ઺૝ܑ܉ܑ܌ܑ,ܜ            (6) 
where yi,t is the log real per capita output (GDP), ki,t is the log of per capita physical capital 
stock, and hi,t is the log of average per capita human capital stock. Similarly, ri,t, fi,t, and aidi,t 
are the log of per capita remittances, FDI, and foreign aid, respectively.4 
Empirically, we use a DOLS specification to estimate the panel data model with the 
logarithm of GDP per capita as the dependent variable in a non-stationary setting. The DOLS 
addresses the issues of endogeneity and residual serial correlation in the regression 
specification, and gives consistent and unbiased estimates. 
ܡܑ,ܜ = 	 ܋ܑ + ∑ ૑ܑܒାܒ∆ܓܑܒାܒ܌૛ܒୀି܌૚ + ∑ ઻૚ܑܒାܒ∆ܐܑܒାܒ
܌૛
ܒୀି܌૚ + ∑ ઻૛ܑܒାܒ∆ܑܚ ܒାܒ
܌૛
ܒୀି܌૚ + ∑ ઻૜ܑܒାܒ∆܎ܑܒାܒ
܌૛
ܒୀି܌૚ +
∑ ઻૝ܑܒାܒ∆܉ܑ܌ܑܒାܒ܌૛ܒୀି܌૚ + હܑܓܑ,ܜ	 + ઺૚ܑܐܑ,ܜ + ઺૛ܑܑܚ ,ܜ	 + ઺૜ܑ܎ܑ,ܜ	 + ઺૝ܑ܉ܑ܌ܑ,ܜ+	ઽܑ,ܜ, ઽܑ,ܜ	ܑ. ܑ. ܌. ۼ(૙, ો૛)
            (7) 
where d1 and d2 are non-negative scalars denoting the orders of lags and leads, respectively, 
and εi,t is the error term. At the estimation stage, we identify the orders of lags and leads 
statistically by the AIC criterion. We allow for heterogeneity for both the short- and long-run 
parameters across countries and estimate the model. However, the reporting presents the 
average of these parameters (with t-statistics and p-values) only. 
4. Empirical results 
We carried out the IPS (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003) test and augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) 
test based on Fisher type test for panel unit roots. Table 2 presents the test results for the 
variables (in levels) in the model for all 18 countries. The IPS and ADF test statistics show 
that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that variables have unit roots for all variables in the 
model, except for foreign aid. Thus, the results confirm that the data series are generally 
characterized as I(1) process; that is, they follow the unit root non-stationary process.5 
//Table 2 about here// 
                                                            
4Due to a lack of data on employment, we use population as the labor force.  
5Although it is acceptable to include a stationary variable in a cointegration regression, we also estimate the 
model without foreign aid and obtain similar results. 
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Given that the panel data series follow unit root processes, we employ panel co-integration 
tests to test if our variables are cointegrated in model (7). We use Kao (1999) and Pedroni 
(1999, 2004) residual co-integration tests. Table 3 reports the results. The Kao test rejects 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5 percent significance level, and thus shows the 
existence of co-integration among the variables in the model. The panel and groups statistics 
for the Pedroni test (6 out 8 tests) are significant at 5 percent or better, and reject the null 
hypothesis. Thus, the tests confirm that the variables are cointegrated. 
//Table 3 about here// 
We use the DOLS estimator, as we explained in Section 3, to estimate the parameters of the 
cointegration relationship. First, Table 4 (model 1) reports the estimates of per capita GDP 
including all variables in equation (7) for the full sample and the sub-samples categorized 
based on LICs and MICs, and Asian and SSA countries. Among the full sample countries with 
all variables in the regression except foreign aid have a positive and significant long-run 
effect on GDP per capita. The coefficient of remittances is 0.048 (t-statistic 3.37), implying 
that a 10 percent growth in per capita remittances increases per capita GDP by 0.48 percent 
when controlling physical and human capital, key channels through which remittances 
potentially affect growth. The results are similar to those of several studies (Siddique, 
Selvanathan, & Selvanathan, 2012) and contradict others (e.g., Singh, Haacker, Lee, & Goff, 
2011). 
//Table 4 about here// 
The modest growth effects suggest that the effects from the favorable outcomes of 
remittances, such as knowledge and technology transfer and increased labor productivity in 
the recipient countries, are stronger than the potential adverse outcomes of remittances, 
such as deteriorating competitiveness and governance, as discussed in Section 2. However, 
there might be a concern about whether the magnitude of these outcomes is heterogeneous 
among countries. We therefore estimate the model among sub-samples categorized based on 
development level and region (panels B-E). The coefficients of remittances are positive 
among all sub-samples, but significant among MICs and SSA countries only. Among MICs, a 
10 percent growth in per capita remittances increases per capita GDP by 0.85 percent 
through the TFP channel, which is about twice the average effect among all sample countries. 
Surprisingly, the impact of FDI on growth through the TFP channel is about four times 
higher than that of remittances: it would lead to a 1.6 percent growth in per capita GDP for a 
10 percent growth in FDI. The remarkable effect may be due to strong diffusion of 
technology with FDI. The results are consistent with previous studies, such as Keller (2004) 
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who shows that the productivity effect of FDI is mainly through technology transfer or 
diffusion. Other studies suggest that the magnitude of the effect may depend on the local 
factors such as financial development (Alfaro et al., 2004), human capital (Borensztein, De 
Gregorio & Lee, 1998; Li & Liu, 2005), open trade regimes (Balasubramanyan, Salisu, & 
Sapsford, 2006), the technology gap (Li & Liu, 2005), and so on. Meanwhile, FDI has 
significant positive coefficients among MICs and Asian countries. In contrast, foreign aid has 
no effect on growth. This result is similar to a few studies (e.g., Rajan & Subramanian, 2008) 
but differs from several other studies (e.g., Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2015). This implies that the 
effect of aid on improving productivity is undetermined. 
Second, we estimate the growth effect of remittances without controlling physical capital and 
human capital in the model, and thus allow remittances to have an impact through these 
channels. For this purpose, we drop human capital and physical capital stock variables one 
by one from the model. In the human capital investment channel (by dropping the human 
capital regressor), the growth effect of remittances becomes larger and statistically stronger 
in the full sample and all sub-samples (Table 4, model 2). In the full sample, a 10 percent 
growth in per capita remittances increases per capita GDP by 0.73 percent; the effect is 
lowest among SSA countries (0.56%) and LICs (0.56%) and highest among Asian countries 
(1.0%). Thus, the size of the growth effect may be remarkable for Asian countries receiving a 
large amount of remittances, such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Vietnam.  
Third, we also allow for the effect of remittances through both the physical and human 
capital investment channel by dropping both the physical capital and human capital 
variables from the model (Table 4, model 3). The coefficients and significance are small in 
the full sample compared to the case in which we drop only human capital (model 2), 
suggesting that remittances have no role in growth through the physical capital investment 
channel, on average. However, the coefficients become larger and stronger among MICs or 
Asian countries in contrast to the undetermined ones among LICs or SSA countries. For 
instance, a 10 percent increase in per capita remittances increases output growth by 1.49 
percent and 1.86 percent in among MICs and Asian countries, respectively. These results 
suggest that remittances have not only a robust growth effect through human capital 
investment, but also through physical capital investment in MICs or Asian countries. 
However, the impact of remittances on growth in LICs or SSA countries seems to occur only 
through the human investment channel.  
Finally, we explore the long-run effects of remittances on physical and human capital 
formation using the DOLS estimator with remittances, FDI, and foreign aid as explanatory 
variables (Table 5). The coefficients of remittances in the models have mostly positive signs, 
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as expected. However, the effect of remittances on physical capital is significant in the full 
sample and the sub-samples of MICs or Asian countries, but not among LICs and SSA 
countries, which is consistent with our previous findings. Meanwhile, remittances have 
significant effects on the human capital model in the full sample and all sub-samples, which 
is also consistent with our findings on the channels through which remittances affect 
economic growth. 
//Table 5 about here// 
Households from least developed countries, such as LICs and SSA, may have severe 
borrowing constraints and they may even fail to get a minimum standard of consumption, 
thus largely falling below the poverty line. Remittance income may help them increase their 
current consumption and bring them out of the poverty trap, but may not necessarily help 
them invest in physical capital. This is consistent with several household surveys that find 
positive effects of remittances on consumption and poverty reduction in LICs and SSA 
countries (e.g., Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2013 for Nepal; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2010 for 
SSA). Meanwhile, others find a positive effect of remittances on physical capital 
accumulation among MICs such as Kenya (Kagochi & Kiambigi, 2012). It is therefore not 
surprising that remittances have no significant effect on capital accumulation in LICs and 
SSA countries. However, remittance recipient households tend to have higher expenditure 
on children's education, irrespective of country (see, Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014 for 
Nepal; De & Ratha, 2012 for Sri Lanka), providing support for our findings for the long-run 
positive effect of remittances on human capital investment at the macro level. In summary, 
our results, consistent with household surveys (Adams, 2011), suggest that the development 
level of a country generally shape the growth effect of remittances. The long-run growth 
effect is generally through the human capital channel, for all countries, and to some extent 
through productivity and physical capital investment. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimated the long-run impacts of remittances on economic growth using a 
panel of similar countries from Asia and SSA. Using a production function approach, we 
estimated the long-run relationship between remittances and per capita GDP, while allowing 
for endogeneity in the regressors and heterogeneous production functions among countries. 
We conclude that the growth effect of remittances depends on the local context and 
development level. Remittances have a significant positive effect on output per capita, which 
occurs mainly through the human capital investment channel, but also to some extent 
through the physical capital investment and productivity channels. The long-run growth 
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effect is generally through the human capital channel, irrespective of the country and to 
some extent through the productivity and physical capital investment. Our findings are 
consistent with previous studies, such as Siddique et al. (2012), and contradict with other 
studies, such as Chami et al. (2012). Remittances have a positive and significant effect on 
human capital, regardless of the sub-sample. In addition, we document the positive and 
strong effect of FDI and human and physical capital investment on growth.  
The results suggest that lower income countries may further benefit from remittances if, in 
addition to investments in human capital, they divert remittances towards investments in 
physical capital, and the adoption of new knowledge, skills and technology. The case will be 
important for labor abundant countries in particular because this will enable them to 
enhance their growth further from increased labor productivity and the short-term migration 
of surplus labor. The main limitation of this paper is that we did not include some similar 
countries from Asia and SSA in the sample due to lack of data availability. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Country 
Sample mean (1975-2014) Average annual growth (1975-2014) 
GDP Capital Human capital Remittances FDI 
Foreign 
aid GDP Population Capital 
Human 
capital Remittances FDI 
Foreign 
aid 
Bangladesh 502 948 1.6 27.0 2.6 17.6 2.7 2.1 4.1 1.3 12.8 0.5 -0.3 
Burkina Faso 408 794 1.1 14.8 2.9 51.3 2.0 2.7 3.2 0.5 0.8 0.7 1.1 
Cambodia 582 651 1.5 10.8 37.6 47.5 5.4 1.8 8.2 1.0 13.9 4.1 0.6 
Cameroon 1,237 2,341 1.6 4.7 14.5 48.3 0.5 2.8 1.0 1.0 7.7 0.9 -0.3 
Ghana 996 1,395 1.9 11.5 30.9 70.5 1.4 2.6 3.1 1.4 16.3 2.3 0.2 
Kenya 887 1,447 1.8 14.1 5.3 54.5 0.8 3.1 1.1 1.3 5.3 0.4 0.6 
Madagascar 472 615 1.4 4.9 9.7 42.2 -1.3 2.9 1.6 0.8 12.3 0.5 -0.1 
Mali 546 846 1.1 21.2 8.4 75.1 1.5 2.5 1.7 0.6 3.7 0.2 -0.1 
Mozambique 262 348 1.1 3.5 25.9 55.5 2.8 2.5 7.4 0.2 1.3 3.6 2.7 
Nepal 419 711 1.3 69.6 0.7 30.5 2.2 1.9 3.0 1.2 16.9 0.0 1.3 
Niger 386 945 1.1 3.7 9.7 50.4 -0.5 3.3 -1.0 0.4 1.8 0.9 -0.6 
Pakistan 794 1,101 1.5 39.0 7.6 17.7 2.1 2.6 2.1 0.9 4.3 0.3 -0.8 
Rwanda 410 553 1.3 3.5 4.5 70.6 2.1 2.5 5.1 1.1 11.5 0.8 1.1 
Senegal 908 1,555 1.3 48.0 11.8 87.5 0.2 2.8 3.2 0.9 6.3 0.6 0.4 
Sri Lanka 1,673 3,134 2.6 110.9 18.9 63.6 3.8 1.1 4.9 0.9 13.3 1.3 -0.4 
Thailand 3,096 7,508 2.1 35.0 77.7 10.3 4.2 1.2 5.8 1.5 10.8 1.7 -0.1 
Uganda 419 552 1.6 22.1 13.7 46.8 2.4 3.3 4.9 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.1 
Viet Nam 848 1,931 2.0 68.9 45.3 26.5 4.8 1.6 4.2 1.3 8.5 2.9 2.5 
LICs 480 768 1.3 18.2 11.2 56.3 1.5 2.6 3.5 0.8 6.5 1.1 0.7 
MICs 1,267 2,536 1.9 37.2 24.8 39.0 2.5 2.1 3.2 1.2 9.9 1.2 0.1 
Asia 1,181  2,463  1.8  51.7  26.3   29.5  3.4 1.8 4.4 1.1 11.2 1.3 0.3 
SSA    638  1,058   1.4  13.6  12.3 59.6  1.0 2.8 2.8 0.9 6.4 1.1 0.5 
All 839 1,571 1.5 26.9 17.5 48.4 1.9 2.4 3.4 1.0 8.1 1.2 0.4 
Note. Sample means are in levels and all the variables are in per capita terms (in US$ at constant prices of 2010), except human capital.  
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Table 2. Panel unit root tests 
Variable 
IPS test Fisher-type test based on ADF  
Statistics  
(w-t-bar) 
Inverse chi-
squared (36) 
Inverse 
normal 
Inverse logit 
t(94) 
Modified inv. 
chi-squared 
P Z L* Pm 
GDP 5.37 17.18 5.027 5.59 -2.22 
Remittances 1.47 25.27 2.0 1.982 -1.27 
FDI -0.54 22.27 2.99 3.34 -1.62 
Foreign aid -4.31*** 64.85*** -3.3*** -63.34*** 3.4*** 
Physical capital 0.64 36.73 0.31 0.36 0.09 
Human capital 5.42 34.05 4.69 5.6 -0.23 
Note. ***, ** and * denote rejection of the null hypothesis that all countries have unit roots at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Trends are not included and tests are computed with three lags except for human capital (calculated 
with one lag) due to insufficient number of time periods to compute W-t-bar. 
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Table 3. Panel cointegration tests 
Test statistics All LICs MICs Asian  SSA 
Statistics p-value Statistics p-value Statistics p-value Statistics p-value Statistics p-value 
A. Pedroni residual cointegration test§ 
Panel statistics (weighted) 
Panel v-Statistics -3.902 1.000 -2.823 0.998 -2.684 0.996 -2.262 0.988 -3.15 0.999 
Panel rho-Statistics -1.973 0.024 -2.065 0.020 -0.588 0.278 1.596 0.945 -2.648 0.004 
Panel PP-Statistics -5.189 0.000 -4.306 0.000 -2.863 0.002 0.546 0.708 -5.439 0.000 
Panel ADF-Statistics -5.343 0.000 -4.966 0.000 -2.881 0.002 0.814 0.792 -6.176 0.000 
Group statistics 
Group rho-Statistic 1.472 0.930 1.172 0.879 0.910 0.819 1.599 0.945 0.607 0.728 
Group PP-Statistic -2.821 0.002 -1.544 0.061 -2.446 0.007 -0.947 0.172 -2.854 0.002 
Group ADF-Statistic -2.539 0.000 -2.763 0.003 -2.543 0.006 -0.704 0.241 -4.237 0.000 
B. Kao residual cointegration test£ 
ADF -2.417 0.018 -1.886 0.030 -2.267 0.012 -1.826 0.034 -1.808 0.035 
Residual variance 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
HAC variance 0.003   0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Note. §No deterministic intercept or trend is included in the estimation of residual. Dickey-Fuller residual variances with correction for the degree of freedom are reported 
and lag length selection was based on AIC with lags from 1 to 9. £No deterministic trends are included in the estimation. The lag length selection was based on AIC with 
maximum of 9 lags. 
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Table 4. Dynamic OLS Estimates of Log of per capita GDP 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) 
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value   Coeff. t-stat p-value 
Panel A. All sample countries 
Remittances 0.048 3.198 0.002 0.073 3.148 0.002 0.056 1.552 0.121 
FDI 0.164 2.097 0.037 0.712 5.232 0.000 1.105 8.178 0.000 
Foreign aid -0.035 -1.205 0.229 -0.157 -3.113 0.002 -0.055 -0.502 0.616 
Physical capital 0.045 1.176 0.240 0.252 3.854 0.000 
Human capital 1.348 7.423 0.000 
Panel 18 18 18 
No of observations 555 552 574 
Panel B. Low income countries 
Remittances 0.012 0.637 0.525 0.057 2.170 0.031 -0.037 -0.617 0.538 
FDI 0.130 1.092 0.276 0.892 4.257 0.000 1.257 5.896 0.000 
Foreign aid -0.083 -1.649 0.101 -0.274 -3.967 0.000 -0.119 -1.105 0.270 
Physical capital -0.023 -0.580 0.563 0.196 2.864 0.005 
Human capital 2.136 6.426 0.000 
Panel 9 9 9 
No of observations 275 272 290 
Panel C. Middle income 
iRemittances 0.085 3.655 0.000 0.089 2.312 0.022 0.149 4.215 0.000 
FDI 0.197 2.075 0.039 0.53284 2.975 0.003 0.952 5.619 0.000 
Foreign aid 0.012 0.377 0.707 -0.04 -0.544 0.587 0.009 0.048 0.962 
Physical capital 0.114 1.743 0.083 0.309 2.802 0.006 
Human capital 0.561 3.146 0.002 
Panel 9 9 9 
No of observations 280 280 284 
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Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) 
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value   Coeff. t-stat p-value 
Panel D. Asian countries 
Remittances 0.047 1.627 0.107 0.100 2.583 0.011 0.186 4.405 0.000 
FDI 0.269 1.915 0.058 0.997 4.484 0.000 1.618 8.151 0.000 
Foreign aid 0.013 0.283 0.778 -0.007 -0.083 0.934 0.032 0.129 0.897 
Physical capital 0.180 2.169 0.032 0.458 5.684 0.000 
Human capital 1.440 6.936 0.000 
Panel 7 7 7 
No of observations 195 193 196 
           
Panel E. SSA countries            
Remittances 0.049 3.390 0.001  0.056 1.936 0.054  -0.027 -0.516 0.606 
FDI 0.097 1.144 0.254  0.531 3.083 0.002  0.778 4.275 0.000 
Foreign aid -0.066 -1.990 0.048  -0.252 -3.963 0.000  -0.110 -1.257 0.210 
Physical capital -0.040 -1.357 0.176  0.121 1.300 0.195     
Human capital 1.290 5.498 0.000         
Panel 11    11    11   
No of observations 360 359 378 
Note. Grouped estimation method is used; country specific effects are included but trend not included in the models. Automatic leads and lags specification (based on 
AIC criterion, max=*) are included in the model. Long-run variances are chosen using AIC criteria; and Bartlett kernel, Newey-West automatic bandwidth, NW 
automatic lag length used to compute individual coefficient covariances.  
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Table 5. Dynamic OLS estimates of physical and human capital formation 
Variables  
Physical capital   Human capital 
 (1)    (2)  
Coeff. t-stat p-value Coeff. t-stat p-value 
Panel A. All sample countries  
Remittances 0.085 1.650 0.100 0.073 5.107 0.000 
FDI 0.446 1.471 0.142 0.241 2.503 0.013 
Foreign aid 0.225 1.451 0.147 -0.033 -0.612 0.541 
Obvs. 652 573 
Panel B. Low income countries  
Remittances -0.016 -0.167 0.867 0.046 3.033 0.0027 
FDI 0.670 1.191 0.235 0.328 2.446 0.0152 
Foreign aid 0.361 1.568 0.118 -0.023 -0.548 0.5845 
Obvs. 281 288 
Panel C. Middle income countries        
Remittances 0.185 4.674 0.000 0.099 4.126 0.000 
FDI 0.223 0.975 0.331 0.155 1.116 0.266 
Foreign aid 0.088 0.427 0.670 -0.043 -0.431 0.667 
Obvs. 371 285 
Panel D. Asian countries 
Remittances 0.213 4.547 0.000 0.078 2.908 0.004 
FDI 1.071 4.501 0.000 0.519 4.477 0.000 
Foreign aid -0.059 -0.223 0.824 -0.067 -0.559 0.577 
Obvs. 195 197 
Panel E. SSA countries 
Remittances 0.003 0.037 0.970 0.069 4.387 0.000 
FDI 0.049 0.104 0.917 0.065 0.463 0.644 
Foreign aid 0.405 2.150 0.032 -0.012 -0.257 0.797 
Obvs. 367 376 
Note. The dependent and explanatory variables are expressed in logarithm. See Table 4 note.
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Table A1. Sample of Countries 
Panel A.  
Countries by Development Level 
 Panel B.  
Countries by Region 
A1. Low Income Countries 
Burkina Faso 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Níger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Uganda 
 
 
B1. Asia  
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
 
A2. Middle Income Countries 
Bangladesh 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Viet Nam 
 B2. Sub-Saharan Africa 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Ghana 
Kenya 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Uganda 
 
 
